This note argues that the fourth, fifth and eleventh cycles take the right approach to knowledge sharing. In particular, this note argues that the Supreme Court should clarify that the nexus requirement is an element of mens rea that presupposes knowledge that one`s own “actions are likely to influence judicial proceedings” and that the availability of circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge does not, in certain circumstances, reduce the nexus requirement to a reasonable element of foreseeability. Two observations emerge from Friske`s more complete application of the Aguilar link. First, Friske wishes to define the purpose of the defendant`s knowledge as the likelihood that the defendant`s actions will affect formal proceedings.  In Frisse`s particular circumstances, this investigation ultimately collapsed knowingly of the proceedings themselves: “Without knowledge of the revocation proceedings, [the accused] could not have known that his actions were likely to influence him.” There was not the slightest evidence that [the accused] knew he was getting something that was prone to decomposition.  Ultimately, however, the likelihood of influencing an administrative procedure is known; Certainty is not required.  The Fifth Circuit`s opinion in United States v. Bedoy also framed the question of the defendant`s mental state as to whether “his testimony may influence the judicial process.”  The probabilistic aspect of the respondent`s object of knowledge gives flexibility to the nexus requirement without throwing knowledge overboard the link.  With the Lexis service, each case also contains key terms, the words – facts, legal and other terms – that the court used most frequently throughout the proceedings, from overview to dissent. Browse to quickly determine relevance to your jurisdiction when searching for case law.
As an exclusive feature of Lexis, you won`t find any basic terms offered by competing jurisdictional search providers. Lexis is the best place to start researching state jurisprudence with over 60,000 reliable legal, news and public record sources. Leverage a best-in-class collection of content with resources to help you work more efficiently, improve customer outcomes, and create more value. Extend and enhance your functionality with the Lexis service. If you are a distance seller of any type of product or service, just assume that you have a connection in each state where you conducted a business transaction. The “natural and probable consequences” doctrine allows an accomplice or co-conspirator to be held criminally responsible for “unplanned misdemeanours or crimes that are reasonably foreseeable, or for the natural consequence of any other criminal activity.”  When applying the doctrine of natural and probable consequences in this context, there are always two crimes: the intentional crime by the accomplice or co-conspirator and the crime actually committed as a result of the proposed criminal enterprise.  The interaction between the element of intent and the circumstances is easy to understand here: the element of intent “relates to the offence in question”, and then certain circumstances are sufficient to transfer the intent to the offence actually committed – essentially “the intention to commit crime A is transferred to crime B”. The government is free to discharge its burden of intent to commit the targeted crime with whatever evidence it can gather – directly or circumstantially. However, the doctrine of natural and probable consequences places an additional burden on the government to demonstrate a “close connection between the targeted crime.” and the offence was actually committed.  The element of intention mens rea always remains; Proof of a “natural and probable consequence” does not replace the burden of proof of intent to commit the targeted offence.  Thus, when Justice Scalia states that “the `natural and probable consequence` is a way of establishing intent,” he is indeed easily off the mark. The doctrine of natural and probable consequences transfers the intent already established for the targeted crime.
The Supreme Court`s mens rea statement on the link requirement in Aguilar and the text bracket for the link requirement in the word “corrupt” highlighted by Marinello paved the way for a full discussion of knowledge sharing in lower courts. Although the Supreme Court has applied the nexus requirement only to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 7212, the lower courts have applied the link to other statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).  The nexus requirement is arguably more natural in section 1512(c)(2) than in section 1503 or § 7212, because section 1512(c)(2) expressly refers to due process: “Who corrupts. obstructing or attempting to otherwise obstruct official proceedings is punishable under this Title by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years, or both.  “Due process” is defined elsewhere as follows: The Court`s subsequent formulation of this nexus requirement, which will be discussed in detail below, has caused problems for lower courts to apply the nexus requirement to the General Obstruction of Justice Act § 1512(c)(2) that is currently in force. The Second and Tenth Judicial Circuits repeated the Court`s subsequent use of the term “natural and probable effect” to conclude that Aguilar requires only that interference with due process be reasonably foreseeable.  Conversely, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Judicial Circuits emphasized the court`s “language of knowledge” to conclude that “knowing that [one`s] actions may influence a formal process” remains an essential element of obstruction of justice under Section 1512(c)(2).  These divergent interpretations of Aguilar underlie the current division of knowledge on obstruction of justice.
Marinello provides further interpretive guidance because it applies the nexus requirement to a statute that already had a well-established understanding of the mens rea element explicitly in the omnibus clause: the word “corrupt.”  Scalia J.A., who starts from Aguilar, and Thomas J., who departs from Marinello, both criticized the Court for imposing a requirement of a link without clear text.  While the omnibus clauses of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 26 U.S.C. There`s probably no clear text hook for a Nexus requirement. Section 7212 suggests this note that the word “corrupt” is not only a practical basis for enshrining the nexus requirement in the text of the law, but also an ideal way to clarify the nexus requirement.  In the midst of these national events, the legal world received a third help in this celebration of obstruction of justice, when the fourth circle reinforced a circular split by adhering to a mens rea understanding of the so-called “nexus requirement.”  The Fourth Circuit, which adjoins the Fifth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits, has held that knowledge is an essential element of an obstruction of justice indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), as opposed to Second and Tenth Circuits, which require no knowledge.  This division of the circle increased the obstruction of justice on a merely interesting issue that drew public attention to an urgent legal issue of national importance. Since the Supreme Court refused to take up the Fourth Circle case, the battle over the element of knowledge of obstruction of justice remains alive and in the hands of lower courts and law journals. The Second Circuit upheld the defendant`s conviction “having regard to the reasonable foreseeability of a formal trial.”  This reasonable predictability was based on the “cultural climate in America regarding terrorist organizations,” the fact that Turkey is a known route to Syria, and the respondent`s knowledge that another American “was arrested at JFK airport for attempting to join ISIS in Syria” and charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist group.  Not only is the connection between the defendant`s conduct and the formal proceedings far too weak to warrant a connection under a formulation of the nexus requirement, but the subject matter of the knowledge considered by the court is misplaced.
After denying the knowledge in connection with the link, the court relied on the defendant`s knowledge of the American arrested at JFK airport to establish the link.  However, the nexus requirement is not related to enforcement proceedings in general; Rather, it is a link to a “special. Carry on.  The respondent`s knowledge of the arrest at JFK Airport shows, at most, that he knew that formal proceedings sometimes result from arrests – much less than what the respondent knew in Aguilar or Marinello, and certainly does not constitute knowledge that his conduct is likely to influence any particular official proceeding.  By applying the nexus requirement to section 7212, Marinello introduces the nexus requirement into a uniform definition of “bribery” as “intent to obtain an unlawful advantage or advantage.” This definition not only provides a useful framework for understanding the nexus requirement as an element of intent mens rea for the particular circumstances of the offence, but also reinforces the legal rationale for maintaining the nexus requirement in the law of obstruction of justice.