Constitutions also differ according to the extent to which human rights recognized by international law or international treaties are recognized in domestic law. In some European countries, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and related decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are transposed into national law and take precedence over any national law incompatible with them. In others, such as the United Kingdom, the courts must interpret legislation as far as possible so that it is compatible with the Convention, but do not have the power to remove it, even if they consider it manifestly contradictory. More recent versions, such as those by Raz (1984a, 1984b), take a completely different approach. In their view, the assertion that X is the holder of rights means that its interests or any aspect thereof constitute sufficient grounds for imposing obligations on others, either not to interfere with X in the performance of an act or to secure it in something. Among other things, this circumvents the problem of third party rights, because the explanation is simply that it is all a question of whether the system recognizes Z`s interests as part of the reason for X and Y`s obligations or whether they are only the interests of X and Y. Raz (1997) pointed out that this does not mean that only the interests of the rightholder are relevant to determining whether any This needs to be acknowledged. as a right. General considerations or considerations of common interest may also be relevant. A related, more controversial point is whether, unlike civil law, criminal law confers legal rights on the citizens it protects. The Orthodox view is that this is not the case, although there may be parallel citizenship. Let us take the case of someone who is unjustly attacked. In most jurisdictions, it is both a felony and a misdemeanor.
Civil law clearly provides a right of recourse, for example to bring an action for damages. However, given that in most jurisdictions it is mainly (and sometimes exclusively) the State that decides whether or not to prosecute for the criminal aspect, the most common view is that the citizen does not have a legal right corresponding to the criminal aspect. So far, there are three permanent regional courts that exist as monitoring bodies specifically for the implementation of human rights: the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples` Rights (ACHPR). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in 1979 by the Organization of American States to interpret and enforce the American Convention on Human Rights. The African Court is the youngest of the regional courts and was established in January 2004. It decides cases in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights concerning member States of the African Union. The judges of the Court, based in Arusha, Tanzania, were elected in 2006 and delivered its first Judgment in December 2009, in which it declared itself incompetent to hear the case of Yogogombaye v. Senegal. The first question is whether property rights, and thus the notion of property, are essentially legal in nature or whether they are more general social phenomena that are simply recognized and legally protected in all modern societies. According to Bentham (1843)”.
There is no natural property. Property is entirely the creature of the law. Bentham`s argument is essentially that what we mean by property is the security of expecting to keep, sell, use, etc. objects, and only the law can guarantee such security. The rights of refugees are expressly guaranteed by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The only regional system with a specific instrument for refugee protection was Africa with the adoption of the Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugees in 1969, but in Europe the ECHR also offers some protection. The practical advantage of regional human rights norms and systems for the protection of human rights is that they are more likely to be created on the basis of closer geographical, historical, political, cultural and social affinities. They are closer to their “home” and are more likely to have greater support. They are also more accessible to policymakers, politicians and victims.
It can therefore be considered as the second “front” for the protection of human rights, the first being the national, the second regional and the third international. According to older versions, such as those of Bentham and Austin, X is a rights holder because he is the intended beneficiary or beneficiary of someone else`s obligation, or perhaps of the absence of an obligation that the law might have imposed on him. For example, if X is entitled to payment of £10 from Y, this is because Y has an obligation which (remit the £10) is intended to benefit X. One of the problems with this theory is to explain why, although criminal law may exist in part to protect moral rights, it is not generally regarded as a direct transfer of legal rights to citizens, even if they are the intended beneficiaries of the corresponding duties. (Of course, there may be parallel civil rights in many systems, but this is a matter of urgency. See below for more information.) Natural rights and legal rights are the two basic types of rights.  An overview of Hart`s theory (1973) can be given to illustrate the first point of view. According to Hart, someone (call him “X”) can be a legitimate rights holder, mainly in two ways. First, X may have bilateral authorization to perform an act, i.e.
X is authorized to both A and non-A (with certain prohibitions for others to interfere). Second, someone else may have an obligation (e.g. to pay £10) over which X has control, mainly by waiver or performance. Since X has a choice in all cases, this explains why he is called the rights holder. One of the difficulties with this type of theory is to explain our apparent reference to rights when there is no choice, for example when one not only has the right to vote, but is also legally required to do so. Not all philosophers agree that rights can be fully analyzed. White (1984), for example, argued that the task is impossible because the concept of one right is as fundamental as any of the others, such as duty, liberty, power, etc. (or a number of them) in which it is usually analyzed. However, he agreed that the rights could be explained in part by reference to those concepts.